The Jurisprudence of Limitation  Clauses with Particular Reference to Section 1 of the  Canadian Charter of Rights and  Freedoms by MBUNDA, L.X.

EDITORIAL BOARD
Professor R H Austin, BA, LLB (Cape Town), LLM (London), Legal Practitioner 
W Ncube BL, M Phil (UZ)
P Lewin BA (Rhodes), LLB (Cape Town), Legal Practitioner
S B O Gutto, LLB (Nairobi), MALD (Tufts) Dip. Int & Comp Law of Human Rights 
(Strasbourg)
Feltoe, BA (Rhodes), LLB (Lond), M Phil (Kent), Legal Practitioner 
A Armstrong, AB (Brown), JD (Boston)
T J Nyapadi, SRN, BA (Hons) Law, (South Bank), LLM (Lond) FMIT (Lond) 
Barrister-at-Law (Lincolns Inn), Legal Practitioner 
M Maboreke BL, M Phil (UZ)
D A B  Robinson, BA (Cape), MA (Oxon), Legal Practitioner 
F G Smith, BL, LLB (Rhodes), Dip AIA (Eng) Legal Practitioner 
K Makamure, LLB & LLM (Lond)
J Stewart, LLB (Lond)
P Nherere, BL Hons (UZ), LLM (Camb) BCL (Oxon)
— E Magad.e, BL, LLB, M Phil (UZ)
B Hlatshwayo BL (UZ) LLM (Harvard)
S Nzombe BL (UZ) LLM (Lond)
C Gorodema BL & LLB (UZ) LLM (Lond)
V Nkiwane BL (UZ) LLM (Warwick)
M L Mhlaba, BL (UZ), Dip. Sp. Etudes Jur. Francaises, DEA-Droit Public (Pau)
L Tshuma, BL, LLB (UZ) LLM (Lond)
Issue Editors
W. Ncube, B Hlatshwayo and M. Maboreke
Faculty o f  Law 
University o f  Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box M P 167 
Mount Pleasant 
Harare 
Zimbabwe
THE
ZIMBABWE LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 6 1988
CONSENTS/
- |! 
Articles \\
No Requiem for the Restraint ;
Doctrine- Yet P. N hcrcre......................................1
No Faull Divorce: Changing s
Divorce Laws in Zimbabwe W. N cube...........i...... ..................32
Corroboration and Rape Trials 
in Zimbabwe A. Armstrong 53
Women under Zimbabwean-La-w* ^
§  FThe Jurisprudence of ^ imitation j 
Clauses with Particular Reference 
to Section 1 of the; Canadian Charter 
of Rights and ITeddem* Q ;j
1 I o• ' .1 > £? ^  !'/The ILO and the RightTo Strike}
Law and Social Transformalibrj 
The Chilean Experiment"’
M.Mjrhoxck^., = 6 4
L .X .M bunda...............................79
B. H. Simamba...... ......................95
V. Nkiwane................................ 107
Judges and Lawyers in Africa Today:
Their Powers, Competence and
Social Role S. B. 0 . Gulto............................134
The Legal Stalus of Parastalals:
Zimbabwe's Experience T. J. Nyapadi............................. 147
Case Notes and Comment
The Decision in Dube v Khumalo 
SC. 103-87: The Supreme Court 
Enforces an Illegal Contract? W. Ncubc 163
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIMITATION CLAUSES 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SECTION 1 OF THE 
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
L.X. MliUNDA*
1. INTRODUCTION
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which is part of 
the [Canadian] Constitution Act, 1982 is a general limitations clause applicable 
to all thc.righls and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. Under this Section, the 
Parliament or Legislature can enact any law which has the effect of limiting any 
of the guaranteed rights or freedoms, provided that the law is “reasonable and can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.* 1
It seems that the intention of the drafters of this section was to bring forward 
the concept that the rights and freedoms spelled out in the Charter tire n o t . 
absolute. This is not a new phenomenon. As a matter of fact actual civic 
experience has shown that rights and freedoms arc not found in such a fashion 
that citizens possess them in their entirety. Rights have got to be balanced against 
one another. The process of balancing of these rights against one another entails 
as of necessity the placement of limits on the extent to which these rights and 
freedoms are enjoyed. In the light of this, Section 1 of the Charter becomes an 
important provision because of its pervasive role in securing accommodation 
between the individual rights guaranteed and the interests of other individuals 
and of the entire community. This gives the courts the task of weighing 
countervailing public purposes against guaranteed rights and freedoms which in 
essence is an exercise of balancing competing interests. A court faced with a 
Section 1 issue has to draw a balance between the interests of the person whose 
rights are affected and the significance to society of the limits that arc laid down 
in the legislation.
On the face of it, Section 1 strikes one as a model oflibcral characterization 
of rights whereby general welfare or majorilarian preferences may sometimes 
trump individual rights. Itinvitcs judgesatcertain instances to uphold limitations 
on a person’s rights because general welfare of majorilarian preference require 
placing those limitations. A liberal like Dworkin, as it shall be argued later, is 
obviously against this provision because to him individual rights arc political 
trumps held by individuals and, therefore, nothing can deny any individual his 
rights once he holds them. This paper discusses Section 1 of the Charter as a 
model of liberal characterization of rights.
By examining cases already decided by the courts on Section I, an asscss-
* Lecturer in Law, Univcrisity of Nairobi, and Advocate of the High Court of Tanzania
1 Schedule B, Canada Act, 1982, C. 11 (U. U.).
ment will be made as to how the courts have so far responded to the liberal 
characterization nature of this Section.
The limitations clause as enacted in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is the outcome of the debate which ensued on Constitutional entrench­
ment of rights and freedom and judicial review as its antecedent. Critics of this 
development expressed the view that entrenchment of rights and freedom* were 
inconsistent with the well established doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and 
majoritarian democracy. The concern was that this leads to law-making by 
appointed judges instead of, and often in conflict with, elected Legislatures. 
Judicial review, the argument went, inevitably involves policy decisions, which 
decisions require value judgments typical of the legislative process. The fear was 
not only that judicial review would bring unwanted additions to existing laws, 
but that it will strike down popular measures for the general welfare purportedly ' 
because of some judicially-imagined conflict with constitutionally entrenched 
rights and freedoms of some individual or minority.2
The present wording in Section 1 differs significantly from that first proposed 
by the Federal government and tabled in both the House of Commons and the 
Senate. The first draft provided as follows:3
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
as are generally accepted in a free and democratic society with a 
parliamentary system of government.
This provision was subjected to serious criticism. Thcbasic argument against 
it was that it left intact the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy. It was 
contended that the courts would read this as creating a presumption of validity 
of any limitations of the Charter rights and freedoms. This would result because 
any measure passed by the majority in a duly elected legislature of parliament 
would arguably be a reasonable limit imposed by law in a free and democratic 
society. Civil libertarian critics feared that the courts would be reluctant to rule 
any such duly legislated limit on Charter rights and freedoms a violation of the 
Charter. These fears were compounded by the historical backdrop of the 
supremacy of the parliament, the presumption of validity and the tradition of 
judicial submissiveness to parliamentary prescription exhibited most starkly by 
the conservative application of the Canadian Bill of Rights. This version of 
Section I was thought to be, in spirit, far less sympathetic to individual rights and 
freedom.
80 Mbunda, The Jurisprudence of Limitation Clauses
2 For dctaiJcd discussion on this debate sec, generally, D.A.Schmciscr “The Case Against 
Entrenchment of a Canadian Bill of Rights" (1973), 1 Dalhousie Law J. 15; The Entrench­
ment of Bill of Rights (1981), 19 AltaL.Rev. 373; P.H. Russel, A. Democratic Approach 
to Civil Liberties (1969), 19 U. Tez.J. 109; R. Dworkin, Taking Rigkts Seriously, Harvard 
University Press, 1977 pp. 197-204.
3 T.J. Christian, “The Limitations of Liberty: A Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (1982), U.D.C. L.R. 105, at pg. 107 (Charter Edition).
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The inclusion of the limitation clause in its present wording of Section 1 is, 
therefore, an obvious and deliberate concerted attempt to reconcile the politi­
cally irreconcilable. It is an effort to reconcile entrenchment with parliamentary 
supremacy and majoritarian democracy. As a general qualifying clause, it 
recognizes in the most unequivocal terms that the guaranteed rights and free­
doms arc not absolute but must yield to certain limitations. The requirement that 
the limits to be effective must be “prescribed by law” is an indication that the 
right to restrict them is reserved to the legislatures only. To this extent, the effects 
of entrenchment of rights and freedoms as far as the elements of parliamentary 
supremacy and majoritarian democracy is concerned, have been at least watered 
down.4
The wording of Section 1 sets out a two step procedure. The initial burden is 
on the person challenging a particular government rule or action to show that a 
guaranteed right of freedom has been infringed. It is only when that is done, that 
the burden shifts to the government to show that it is a reasonable limitation 
which can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This means 
that the mere fact that a legislation is in relation to, or affects a constitutionally 
guaranteed liberty, docs not per se invalidate it. It simply means that the person 
attacking the legislation or government action has satisfied his burden under the 
initial part of Section 1 of the Charter by showing that a guaranteed right is 
implicated. The impugned legislation or action can still be upheld if the 
government can show that it is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.
This shift of burden of proof is a very important element of Section 1 for it 
certainly gives litigants a fairer chance in contesting enactments and the 
administrative interpretation given such enactments that may be inconsistent 
with the Charter.5 So, although Section 1 invites judges sometimes to uphold 
limitations because of the general welfare of the society or because of majorilar- 
ian preferences, the burden of proof makes it difficult for the courts to allow this 
to happen. The burden is heavy because it demands a high standard of public 
purpose before allowing any government act to intrude upon a protected right or 
freedom. This is evidenced by the courts’ construction of the words “reasonable 
limits prescribed by law” and “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society” and the requirements of adducing evidence in support of all these as 
shown below.
2. WHAT ARE REASONABLE LIMITS
Prior to judicial consideration several attempts were made to identify the 
meaning of “reasonable limits” in Section I. T J. Christian suggested three 
considerations injudicial treatment of this component. The first is that any limit
4 B.L. Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts. The Function and Scope o f 
Judicial Review, Second lid. 1981, Butlcrworlhs, pg. 59.
5 W.S. Tamopotsky & G.A. Ilcaudoin (lids.), The Canadian Character o f Rights and 
Freedoms, A Commentary, pg- 73.
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on Charter rights should be rationally connected to the attainment of a legitimate 
state object. Secondly, it should not be more excessive than is necessary to attain 
the legitimate state object, that is, the limitation should be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. Lastly, limitations on Charter rights should not be 
inspired by arbitrary or capricious reasons or motivated by bad faith. In short, 
limitations should be bona fide and justifiable on sound social policy.6 78
The European Court of Human Rights has on several occasions considered 
the meaning of a similar, though not identical, expression found in Article 14 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.1 In the Belgian Ca.w^thc court set 
forth the following rule of interpretation:
. .  . The principle of equality of treatment is violated if the 
distinction has no objective and reasonable justification. The 
existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation to the 
aim and effects of the measure under consideration. A difference 
of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the convention 
must not only pursue a legitimate aim. Article 14 is likewise 
isolated when it is clearly established that there is no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realized. (Emphasis provided).
This test was endorsed again by the European Court in the Ilandyside Case9 10
where it slated:
Freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society . . .  Restrictions on that freedom must be 
proportionate to the aim pursued and the court must decide 
whether the reasons given by the national authorities for their 
. actions arc relevant and sufficient. (Emphasis provided).
In Canada the meaning of the phrase “reasonable limits” has been addressed 
by a few courts. In Quebec Protestant School Board v A.G. Quebec (No. 2)in the 
court expressed the view that defining “reasonable limit” means lhat the court has 
to deal with the means employed in the Bill or Act or Regulation to attain its 
objective. That is, whether the means arc carried out within a reasonable limit, 
if not, the court held, they must yield to the Charter. Demographic evidence taken 
in support of and against the reasonableness of the legislation made the court 
accept the legitimacy of the legislative objective which was the Francisalion of 
education in Quebec. However, the court found the restrictions on entry to 
English schools in Quebec to be unnecessarily or disproportionately restrictive 
of the Constitutional rights guaranteed by Section 23. The legislative Haw here 
was the means employed to achieve the legilimate purpose.
6 T.J. Christian, “The Limitation of Liberty ...” op. cit.at pg. 107-108.
7 ROME 1950 with Revisions.
8 Yearbook o f the European Convention on Human Rights, 1968, pg. 833 at 86.
5 Yearbook o f  the European Convention o f Human Rights, 1976 pg. 507 at pg. 511.
10 (1982) 140, D.L.R. (3d) 33, at pg. 71.
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In Re Southam Inc. apd the Queen11 the court found the statutory objective, 
which was protection of children, not unreasonable, but found the absolute and 
unqualified prohibition against any public access to the Family Division of the 
Provincial Court under S .12 (1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act an infringement 
of S. 2(b) of the Charter that could not be justified under S. 1. The same reasoning 
was adopted in Ontario film and Video Appreciation Society v Ontario Board o f 
Censors, 12 where the court found justification for censorship or limiting of 
exhibitions of films but found the method used to have an unnecessarily 
inhibiting effect on lire maker or exhibitor of the film. A limit on freedom of 
expression by censorship could be achieved by using a less drastic means.
In all the above cases the court accepted the rationality of the objective, but 
the legislation was found to be bad on account of a defective legislative 
technique. In summary, one may say that the standard by which the reasonable­
ness of the limitation of a Charier right is to be assessed is that the court must be 
satisfied that a valid legal, social or other objective is served by the limitation of 
the right and that the limitation is restricted to that which is necessary for the 
attainment of the desired objective. In other words, a limit is reasonable if it is 
a proportionate means to attain a legitimate purpose of the law. It will be argued 
later in this paper that the interpretation of the courts of this phrase and the others 
in sect ion 1 is vague and makes reliance on it unsafe for purposes of achieving 
any majoritarian preferences at the expense of the rights and freedoms of an 
individual.
2.2 PRESCRIBED BY LAW
The expression “prescribed by law” has also been the subject of both judicial 
and extra-judicial consideration. Two requirements were slated to be implicit in 
this phrase in Sunday Times v United Kingdom:13
First the law must be adequately accessible. The citizen must be 
able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of 
the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm 
cannot be regarded as a “Law” unless it is formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: 
he must be able . . .  to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail. . .
In the Federal Republic o f Germany v Rauca14 the court was more concerned 
with the criterion of the legal validity of the limitation when it said:
The phrase “prescribed by law” requires the limitation to be laid
11 (1983) 146 D.L.R. (3d) 408.
12 (1983) 41 O.R. (2d) 583.
13 2 E.II.R.R. 245.
1,1 (1983) 38 O.R. (2 d) 705, alpg. 716.
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down.by some rule of law in a positive fashion and not by mere 
implication. The rule of law containing limitation will normally 
be statutory although it is possible that it may be found in 
delegated legislation or in the form of a common law rule.
For the purpose of Section 1, a limitation on the rights and freedoms set out 
in the Charter is prescribed by law, if the law containing the limitation is properly 
promulgated by a duly authorized legislator or by an official acting within the 
bounds of statutory jurisdiction to enact delegated legislation. Not only that, but 
it must also provide for detailed criteria for its application, sufficiently precise 
to permit all those potentially affected to determine when and how it applies.15 
This requirement is consonant with Dicey’s view of the rule of law and the 
principle that there should be absolute supremacy or predominance of regular 
law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power. It excludes the existence of 
arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part 
of the government.16 *
It may be argued that the courts’ interpretation of the phrase “prescribed by 
law” is an acknowledgement and reaffirmation of the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy and majoritarian democracy. This can, therefore, be taken as a 
consolation for those who were against entrenchment of rights and freedoms for 
fear that judicial review arising from this entrenchment would either substitute 
democratically enacted legislations with judge-made laws or strike out general 
welfare schemes so as to protect individual or minority rights. Indeed, Justice 
Steele in Justine Elizabeth Blainey and the Ontario Hockey Association andThe 
Ontario Human Rights Commission17 seems to suggest so when he staled:
In the agreement reached by the Parliament of Canada and the 
Legislatures of the provinces resulting in the United Kingdom 
Parliament enacting the Charter, the legislative bodies did not 
surrender all their powers to the individuals. While the Charter is 
powerful, the legislative bodies, in S. I, retained to themselves the 
protection o f society as a whole. Section 1 must be interpreted in 
this light. (Emphasis provided).
I am, however, of the view that far from protecting majoritarian preferences 
or society as a whole as Steele, J. suggested, the fact that restrictions or 
limitations protecting majoritarian preferences must have legal force is more in 
line with protecting individual or minority rights than majoritarian preferences. 
If limitations were not to be prescribed by law, individual or minority rights 
would be more vulnerable to violation because they would be left to the whim 
of the executive. If it decided, the executive could take any measures which
15 R. Ilovius & R. Martin, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom in the Supreme 
Court of Canada (1983), 61, The Canadian Bar Review, at pg. 235.
16 A.V. Diccy, Introduction o f the Study o f the Law o f theConstitulion, London MacMillan 
& Co. Ltd. at pg. 202.
Supreme Court of Ontario, 25th September 1985 (unreported) pg. 20 of the judgment.17
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infringed upon individual rights at will in the name of general welfare of the 
society.
This argument was well canvassed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re 
Ontario film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board o f Censors.™ In 
this case while the courts conceded that the statutory law, regulations and even 
common law limitation may be permitted, it held, however, that to be accepted 
the limit must have legal force. The court was of the opinion that precise legal 
criteria for the exercise of discretion helped to prevent arbitrary decisions. 
Moreover requiring these criteria to be contained in the law itself rather than in 
administrative guidelines, the court opined, strengthens political accountability 
and makes it more likely that the law. will be subject to public discussion and 
scrutiny. Crown Counsel, on the other hand, argued that the board’s authority to 
curtail freedom of expression was prescribed by law in the Theatres Act, SS. 3, 
35, and 38. To this end, the court took the view that, although there had certainly 
been a legislative grant of power to the board to censor and prohibit certain films, 
the reasonable limits placed upon that freedom of expression of film-makers had 
not been legislatively authorized; that the Charter requires reasonable limits that 
arc prescribed by law; and that it was not enough to authorize a board to censor 
or prohibit the exhibition of any film of which it disapproved. That kind of 
authority, the court held, is not legal for it depended on the discretion of an 
administrative tribunal. That kind of regulation could not be considered as law 
because the limits placed on the freedom of expression were left to the whim of 
officials. The standards and pamphlets published by the Board and to which it 
purported to adhere in exercising its authority were found by the court to have 
no legislative or legal force of any kind because the Board was not bound by those 
standards. Since they did not qualify as law, they could not be employed so as 
to justify any limitation on expression, pursuant to Section 1 of the Charter.
The word “justified” is the key word in this phrase and forms the cornerstone 
of the expression. In its ordinary meaning the phrase means to show, or maintain 
the justice or reasonableness of an action; to adduce adequate grounds for; or to 
defend as right or proper. The legal use of the word is to show or maintain 
sufficient reason in court for doing that which one is called upon to answer for.18 9
Justification in this phrase, is however qualified by the word “demonstrably” 
which means in a way .which admits of demonstration. This in turn means 
capable of being shown, or made evident or capable of being proved clearly and 
conclusively. For the justification to be demonstrable the reasons for limitation 
can not merely be hypothetical. There must be evidence or grounds for the 
limitation which must be shown to have existed prior to or at the-lime of the 
limitation of aguaranlccd right or freedom.20 It will be argued later dial the whole
18 (1983) 41 O.R. (2d) 583 at 592.
19 Federal Republic o f Germany v Rauca, op. cit. at pg. 716.
20 W.E. Conklin, “Interpretation and Applying the Limitations" Clause. An Analysis of 
Section 1” (1982), 4 Supreme Court L:L. Rev. 75 at pg. 82.
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question of discharge of burden of proof under Section 1 is in fact centred on 
evidence, although so far it is unclear as to what type of evidence would suffice 
for this purpose.
2.4 IN A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
The phrase imports the notion of comparison with other free and democratic 
societies. The obvious question which arises is which free and democratic 
society is relevant for comparison. Case law indicates at least three comparators 
to which the courts have been very responsive. These have been referred to ci thcr 
by the courts suo motto, or at the instance of Crown. Counsels. The first is 
legislation and judicial decisions made in Canada before the proclamation of the 
Charier on 17th April 1982. Courts have in many Charter cases examined 
whether a Canadian consensus exists when a provincial law or practice has been 
in issue.21 The second is legislation and judicial decisions made in other Western 
democracies like the U.K., the IT S N ew  Zealand and other countries of Western 
Europe. This has occurred mostly where a federal law or practice has been 
challenged and courts have been greatly influenced by whether similar restric­
tions exist in other democratic societies. Where other democratic societies 
operate without similar restrictions the government has been required to show 
why the Canadian situation uniquely requires it.
The third is composed of the standards expressed in International conven­
tions. This has been so because much of the wording employed in the Charter 
bears a strong similarity to that found in International conventions.
One point is worth mentioning here. Although determining whether a 
particular limitation is reasonable and demonstrably, justified in a free and 
democratic society involves considering whether similar restrictions exist in 
other democratic nations, the fact that a Stale’s law or practice is out of step with 
that prevailing in other states docs not necessarily imply that it can not be 
considered necessary' in a democratic society. The technique of comparative 
surveys of the laws of member stales is employed on occasion at most as an 
indicator of what measures arc justified in a democratic society.
So far die discussion has dwelt on what has been the courts’ interpretation of 
Section 1. This has been important in advancing the thesis that the liberal 
characterization of rights and freedoms under Section 1 is not in fact a blanket 
tool catering for majoritarian preferences as it may look at its face value.
The interpretation of the courts of the different components of that Section, 
and the shift of burden of proof shows how difficult it is to use it for furtherance 
of the general welfare of the society at the expense of individual rights and 
freedoms.
It is obvious that Section 1 of the Charter requires the courts to engage in a
21 Federal Republic o f  Germany v Rauca, op. cil.
1balancing process. The permissible limits of government action on one hand 
must be measured against the rights of the individual on the other.22
I am aware that Section 1 as a general limitation clause with its balancing 
process may seem to offend several Dworkinian theories. The first is his concept 
of rights which is basically anti-utilitarian. To Dworkin individual rights arc 
political trumps held by individuals. Accordingly, if someone has a right to 
something then it is wrong for the government to deny it to him, even though it 
would be in the general interest to do so. His harm principle is such that it is wrong 
todclibcratclydcnyan individual his righteven if there were long term utilitarian 
benefits to be gained. Someone suffers harm according to Dworkin if the 
deprivation of his rights causes him pain or frustrates plans that he deems 
important to his life. Since moral harm is a subjective notion, it follows that moral 
harm occurs whenever someone is morally harmed, even when no one knows or 
suspects it. Therefore, a system that subjects individual rights to ordinary 
utilitarian calculus docs not recognize the independence or importance of moral 
harm, or if it docs, docs not recognize that even an accidental denial of an 
individual right is an occasion of moral harm. Dworkin’s postulate of moral 
political rights requires the government to treat all its citizens as equals, that is, 
as equally entitled to concern and respect. In the same vein no political decision 
may deliberately impose on a citizen a much greater risk of moral-harm than it 
imposes on any other, although a greater bare harm on some than on others may 
be imposed.23
In relation to limitation clauses under the Charter, the writer is of the view that 
Dworkin’s concept of rights with his acceptance of the harm principle is not 
offended so long as it presupposes that rights arc not absolute in the sense that 
individuals either possess them in their entirety or not at all. Eycn civic 
experience has shown that rights can not be absolute because they have to be 
balanced againstoncanothcr. Thisproccssof balancing against thcothcr, entails* 
as of necessity, placing limits on the extent to which these rights arc enjoyed. 
This is what thccourts are called upon to do in Section 1 of the Charter. Dworkin, 
however, takes issue with this process of striking a balance between the rights 
of the individual and the demands of society at large. According to him, this 
balancing model docs not give sufficient weight to the value of individual rights 
and freedoms. He finds this model to be indefensible because it rests on a mistake 
of confusing society’s rights with the rights of members of the society. It assumes 
that the rights of the majority is a competing right that must be balanced in some 
way. This, he says, threatens to destroy the concept of individual rights.24 The 
most cogent answer to this argument is that this approach, that is, the balancing 
model, contrary to what Dworkin assumes, docs not require that the right or 
freedom at issue and any countervailing interests be viewed as qual ilati vc val ucs.
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22 Justice Hlain in R.V. Bryant, (1984) 48 O.R. 201.
23 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter o f Principle, Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 72-103 and 
Pg- 359
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, op. cit. alpg. 197.24
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This point is well illustrated in Dudgeon v United Kingdom.75 In this case the 
appellant was a homosexual who alleged that his right to respect for his private 
life, protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was 
violated by the existence of laws making it a criminal offence for consenting 
male adults to engage in certain homosexual acts even in private. These laws, 
were still in force in Northern Ireland though not. in the rest of the United 
Kingdom. The government argued that the alleged interference was “necessary 
in a democratic society . . .  for protection o f . . .  morals, o r . . .  the rights and 
freedoms of others. The court agreed that the laws promoted legitimate aims, but 
concluded:
Such justifications as these for retaining the law in force 
unamended are outweighed by the detrimental effects which the 
very existence of the legislative provisions in question can have 
on the life of a person of homosexual orientation like the appli­
cant. Although members of the public who regard homosexuality 
as immoral may be shocked, offended or disturbed by the 
commission by others of private homosexual acts, this can not on 
its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is 
consenting adults alone who arc involved.2*
Dworkin’s second theory which may also appear to be offended by Section 1 
of the Charter and which is partly related lohis rights theory is that which requires 
judges to decide cases on grounds of principle rather than policy. He gives an 
example of two different questions which a judge might ask himself to distin­
guish questions of principle from questions of policy. A judge asking himself 
whether the plaintiff, all things considered, has a right to what he asks, addresses 
himself to a question of principle because this one appeals to the judge’s theory 
of legal rights. On the other hand, a judge asking himself whether if he decides 
for. the plaintiff, his decision will make the community better off as a whole 
addresses himself to a question of policy because this draws on his convictions 
about the ideal society and the best strategy for reaching that ideal.
There is an inconsistency at once apparent between this theory and Section. 
1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 1 says that there arc circum­
stances where infringement of these rights is reasonable. This requires the judges, 
to articulate the fundamental values of society and set their order of priority. The 
judges have to decide whether a given societal value is more important than one 
or the other of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.25 67 
Dworkin urges these judges to appeal to considerations of principle, that is, 
considerations specifying their rights, and not to considerations of policy or 
appeals to the general welfare. This proposition of Dworkin is strange and 
laughable, especially because he himself argues that law is a “deeply political”
25 4 n.II.R.R. 149 (European Court of Human Rights 1981).
26 Ibid at pg. 167.
27 Dig M. Drug Mart Ltd. and Her Majesty The Queen (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 121 at 142.
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matter. Indeed laws arc nothing but policies or political will of the ruling class 
couched in the most general way, to impose and declare duties, liabilities, 
prohibitions and rights of particular groups of people in the general public. 
Courts, and, therefore, judges for that matter, are in the arena of politics from 
their inception. It is curious to suggest that any institution of the state is apolitical 
in functions or nature. The courts will therefore find it difficult not to allow a 
limitation on a guaranteed right or freedom, where if it is not permitted then harm 
will be caused to other values in society.
Again, on the face of it Section 1 may appear to be a utilitarian characteriza­
tion of rights and freedoms for utilitarianism regards a decision as correct if it 
maximizes utility across some community. This is generally taken to mean 
maximizing average happiness or the degree to which people s preferences arc 
satisfied. On this account, utilitarianism requires law and its institutions to serve 
the general welfare and nothing else. It requires some citizens to give up or.cven 
be made to give up something to which they are otherwise entitled for the goal 
of the community as a whole. As can be seen, utilitarianism runs contrary to 
Dworkin’s rights theory.
The courts’ approach to Section 1 however, clearly negates any attempt of 
characterizing rights and freedoms under it on utilitarian grounds. Two decisions 
of the Supreme Court of Canada show this. The first is the case of Regina vBig  
M., Drug Mart Ltd.™ At issue in this case was Si 4 of Ihc Lord’s Day Act28 9 which 
was challenged as being unconstitutional by reason of its contravention of the 
guarantee to freedom of religion and conscience in S. 2(a) of Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. The most outstanding utilitarian argument is found in 
the dissenting judgment of Belzil,J. A. of the Alberta Court of Appeal who stated.
It is not inconsistent with the basic principles of democracy of the
Charier that the views of the majority should receive preferred
attention from government. . .  Civil authority, while bowing to 
pressure from religious groups, recognized the moral value of a 
day of rest — that it should have selected the day of the week 
regarded as holy by the great majority of Canadians is not 
inconsistent with the basic principles of democracy . .  .30
The Supreme Court of Canada, speaking through Dickson, C.J. rejected this 
argument in the strongest terms in the following words:
What may appear good and true to a majorilarian religious group, 
or to the state acting on their behest, may not for religious 
reasons, be imposed upon citizens who lake the contrary view.
28 (1984) 5 D.L.R. (4ih) 121.
29 R.S.C. 1970, C L-3.
(1984) 5 D.L.R. (4lh) 121 alpp. 156-157.30
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The Charier safeguards religious minorilics from the ihrcal of 
“ihc tyranny of the majority”.31
The Supreme Court of Canada had occasion to reiterate this statement in 
Ilarebhjan Singh & Six Others el. v Minister o f Employment and Immigration,32 
The appellants in this ease claimed that the procedure for determining refugee 
status claims established in the Immigration Act, 1976, ss. 55 was inconsistent 
with the requirements of fundamental justice articulated in S. 7 of the Charter 
because it did not provide a refugee claimant with.adcquatc opportunity to stale 
his ease and to know the ease he has to meet. Counsel for the Minister submitted 
with respect to Section 1 that Canadian procedures with respect to the adjudica­
tion of refugee claims had received the approbation of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and that it was not uncommon in 
commonwealth and Western European countries for refugees claims to be 
adjudicated administratively without a right to appeal. Counsel submitted 
further that a requirement of an oral hearing in every ease where an application 
for redetermination of a refugee claim has been made would constitute an 
unreasonable burden on the Board’s resources. It was Dickson, C J. again, who 
came out very strongly against this utilitarian argument. She said:
I have considerable doubt that the type of utilitarian consideration 
brought forward . . .  can constitute a justification for a limitation 
on the rights set out in the Charter. Certainly the guarantee of the 
Charter would be illusory if they could be ignored because it was 
administratively convenient to do so. No doubt considerable time 
and money can be saved by adopting administrative procedures 
which ignore the principles of fundamental justice, but such an 
argument. . .  misses the point of the exercise under Section l.33
Limitations can sometimes be compromised with liberalism albeit to a 
limited extent. Liberalism claims that individuals’ rights cannot be sacrificed for 
the sake of the general good, and that the principles of justice that specify these 
rights can not be premised on any particular vision of the good life. Liberalism 
sees the self as prior to and independent of its interests and ends. The priority of 
the self docs not define one wi ih his claims and attachments, that is, one’s identity 
is never tied to his aims and interests. One may at any moment choose his own 
plan of life. Liberalism counts at satisfaction of an individual’s personal 
preference which is found by the assignment of goods or advantages, including 
liberties, to himself; whereas his external preferences arc for such assignment to 
others. Liberalism is therefore a refined or purified kind of utilitarianism in the 
sense that it counts only personal preferences in assessing the balance of social 
welfare to where the balance of personal self-interest preferences supports some 
restriction on freedom, the restriction is justified because the freedom restricted
31 Her Majesty The Queen and Big M. Drug Mart Ltd. Supreme Court of Canada, April 24, 
1985 (unreported) pg. 56. Now reported (1985) 1 S.C.R. 295.
32 Supreme Court of Canada, April 4,1985 (unrcporicd) Now reported (1985) 1 S.C.R. 177.
33 Ibid ai pg. 63 of the judgment.
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is not a moral or political right. In this way liberalism may justify laws 
diminishing or. limiting rights and freedoms.
The remaining part of this paper discusses the requirement of adducing 
evidence to justify any limitation under Section 1 as a means of discharging the 
burden of proof. This is done because this requirement puts the last nail in the 
coffin of liberal characterization of rights and freedoms under Section 1.
The requirement of adducing evidence was introduced in Re.Southam Inc. 
and The Queen (No. 1) where the court stated:
. . .  The wording imposes a positive obligation on those seeking 
to uphold the limit or limits to establish to the satisfaction of the 
court by evidence, by terms and purpose of the limiting law, its 
economic, social and political background . . .  that such limit or 
limits arc reasonable and demonstrably justified.34
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal put it more succinctly in the following 
words:
. . .  To decide the issue of reasonableness the decision maker will 
need to know the circumstances that bear upon the issue, the 
circumstances of those who will be detrimentally affected if the 
limit is imposed and the circumstances of those who will be 
detrimentally affected if the limit is not imposed. He will need 
information from which he can determine the effect and the 
consequences of imposing the limit and of not imposing it. T h e '. 
decision maker will also need to know what choices or limits the 
legislator had when they made their selection . . . 35 36
From the above quoted statements, it is clear that judges must be provided 
with a broad range of evidence. Extensive materials, documenting, various 
arguments for justifying limitations must be prepared. There is also need to 
adduce extrinsic evidence to document Lite evolution and rationale of legislation 
under consideration. Section 1, however, is pregnant with a lot of problems. A 
party seeking to shelter under a limitation clause can not know for sure, whether 
to adduce evidence or not and what evidence to adduce so as to discharge his onus 
of proof.
. In Re Federal German Republic v Rauca36 for instance, a common sense 
approach to the reasonableness of the Extradition Act was employed by thccourt. 
It found the Act to be a response to the international mobility of criminals and 
the need for international cooperation in dealing with that problem. The court 
reviewed various international undertakings that relate to the right under Section
3,1 (1982) 41 O.R. (2d) 113 at pg. 118-119.
35 (1985)5 W.W.R. 95, at 119.
36 Op. cit.
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6 of the Charier and concluded that extradilion conslilulcd ihe remedy thal is 
most consonant with ihe overall structure of the administration of justice in 
Canada. There was little, if any, evidence as to the abstract rationality of the 
Extradition Act. The onus of reasonableness was clearly discharged on the basis 
of argument not fact.
The same approach was adopted in Re Southam Inc. andThe Queen (No. I)37. 
though with different results and in Re Ontario film & Video (Appreciation 
Society) and Ontario Board o f Censors.38
On the other hand, the Ontario Court of Appeal expressed disappoinUncnt 
over the Counsel for the Attorney General’s failure to adduce evidence so as to 
discharge the burden in Section 1. It said:
Despite the fact that this court has affirmed on several occasions 
that the onus of proof under Section 1 is on the party seeking to 
uphold the validity of impugned legislation, Counsel for the 
Altorncy General submitted no evidence beyond referring to the . 
fact lhal Sunday was a common day of closing in such countries 
as the U.S., the U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Japan as well 
as British Columbia and Manitoba. She presented no other 
evidence, however, showing why such limitations in other 
jurisdictions are reasonable nor did she show how they were 
justified.39
Although the court in this Case concluded that there may be instances where 
such bare analogies m ight be sufficient proof to meet the requirements of Section 
1, it however held that they were certainly not sufficient in this case.
A similar disappointment was expressed by the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v The Government o f 
Saskatchewan, where it said:
. . .  In the end, I am compelled to say that there was sufficient 
material before the Chambers of the judge to enable him to 
engage in the balancing process he needed to engage in to arrive 
at a reasoned decision, upon the reasonableness of the lim it.. ,40
Case law also suggests that not every case of justification will require 
evidence though others may do so. In the Retail Wholesale Case, the court was 
‘ quick to point out in one of its cautionary notes that
. . .  The outline of the need in the present case for evidence of
37 Op. cil.
38 Op. cit.
39 Regina v Videoflicks Lid. (1984) O.R. (2d) 395 at 428.
(1985) 5 W.W.R. 95 at 119.40
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circumstances of a certain scope is not to be taken as laying down 
an inflexible rule of universal application in cases engaging the 
limit provision of Section 1 of the Charter. Some cases will 
dictate the need for evidence of a lesser scope, some of a greater 
scope, some (where the reasonableness of limit is self-evident) of 
no evidence of circumstances whatever, depending where on the 
continuum the case falls.41
Whatever the case, the problems of Section 1 remain unresolved and will 
remain so for quite some time. The court has acknowledged that fact in the Law 
Society o f Upper Canada v Skapindcr where it stated:
. . .  Section 1 and this very process are difficult to many. As 
experience accumulates, the law profession and the courts will 
develop standards and practices which will enable the parties to 
demonstrate their position under Section 1, and the courts to 
decide issues arising under that provision.42
The problem is how Counsel for the Crown is supposed to distinguish 
between cases which dictate the need for evidence from those which do not, let 
alone those which dictate the need for evidence of a lesser scope or a greater 
scope. Even if he is able to draw such a distinction, the type of evidence he should 
adduce so as to discharge his burden of proof is still unclear. What information 
should the government provide the Court with to enable it to balance the factors 
inherent in the circumstances of each individual case with a view to making a 
reasoned decision in respect of the justification of any limit? All these arc still 
begging questions.
'SW T-A VA ILA B LEj j - n  LuAtM AND MAY K ifiT  nr
3. conclusRswoved from the LIBRARY.
It is contended that with the present absence of any criteria as to what is a 
reasonable limit, or what is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society, the burden of the government is a heavy one and difficult to discharge. 
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that most of the decisions of the 
government arc made on empirical speculation without any feasibility study 
which makes it difficult to predict what will happen in the future. To require the 
government to justify any legislation by adducing evidence or providing reliable 
information going to the circumstances of its enactment is almost to ask for an 
impossibility. To this extent the Charter docs not provide much aid because it 
does not elaborate on the considerations which are relevant or the material which 
is probative in determining whether a controverted law is reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. It is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the test for limitations on rights and freedoms in Section 1 of the
41 Ibid at pg. 119. See also a similar observation by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in 
Re Reich and College o f Physicians and Surgeons o f Alberta (1984) 8 D.L.R. (4lh) 691 at 
715.
(1984) 1 S.C.R. 357 at 384.42
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Charter is a subtle and flexible one. The slate’s burden varies depending on the 
nature of the right or freedom involved, the context in which it is asserted and the 
extent of the limitation in question. The limitation clause unlike the override 
clause, is too vague to be employed with confidence by Parliament or the 
Legislature itself because it is only a judicial decision which can settle conclu­
sively the question whether a particular law transgresses the Charter or is saved 
by die limitation clause. These arc the facts which support the contention made 
earlier in this paper that the liberal characterization of rights and freedoms under 
Section ] by itself does not necessarily make general welfare or majoritarian 
preferences trump individual rights and freedoms. Utilitarians cannot lake 
comfort in it nor can Dworkin or Liberals take offence from it.
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